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The ability of military aircraft maintenance personnel to prepare aircraft for flight 
depends not only on the technical ability and availability of replacement parts, but also on 
access to serviceable support equipment.  While the general relationship between support 
equipment failures and aircraft availability is understood, the struggle to quantify that 
relationship makes targeted support equipment replacement or quantity authorization 
increases difficult.  Tight budgets and aging equipment further complicate the task of 
keeping serviceable support equipment assets in the hands of maintainers.  We identify 
key pieces of support equipment which may affect aircraft availability and other metrics 
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COMMON SUPPORT EQUIPMENT  
AND ITS IMPACT ON AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY 
I.  Introduction 
Background 
Common Support Equipment (CSE) used to facilitate ground maintenance on a 
wide array of aircraft is aging and becoming less reliable.  The decrease in reliability 
coupled with a reduction in the number of available CSE assets is and will continue to 
negatively affect aircraft availability rates (Havlicek, 1997).  Therefore, the purpose of 
this study is to examine the impacts that degrading CSE reliability and availability have 
on required maintenance activities and Aircraft Availability (AA).   
AA is the universal standard for overall unit readiness and effectiveness (Raney, 
Young, & Golden, 2009).  Of the two metrics used to calculate AA, Not-Mission Capable 
Maintenance (NMCM) captures maintenance factors such as repair actions/hours, 
maintenance downtime/reliability, and 8-hour fix rates (Oliver, Johnson, White III, & 
Arostegui, 2001).  Each of these factors can be impacted by CSE due to its inherent use 
in maintenance activities, but while the requirement for CSE has not diminished, the 
funding to replace outdated equipment falls far short of annual requests.  For example, 
the 2013 request for CSE funding, which was aimed at maintaining and updating a fleet 
of 214 million individual items, was funded $1.24B short (Sprague, 2014).  One reason 




between CSE and the AA.  Justification of funding could be better articulated and the 
worldwide fleet of CSE could be better updated, increased, or optimized if such a 
relationship could be found.  This research was scoped and developed in partnership with 
its sponsor, AFMC/A4M & A4P   
Problem Statement 
The thesis of this research is that AA is being negatively impacted by a CSE fleet 
which has become less reliable than designed even though the current number of CSE 
assets available are above the authorized levels. 
Research Objectives and Questions 
Quantifying the relationship between CSE and AA will require an examination of 
equipment availability and reliability levels and a comparison of those levels to AA rated 
during the same time period.  Working with this research’s sponsor, the following 
research questions were developed to explore specific facets of the CSE/AA relationship.     
1. What impact does common support equipment (CSE) have on Aircraft 
Availability? 
2. What statistical relationship best describes how CSE authorizations and levels 
affect aircraft availability? 
3. What LIMS-EV Equipment View shortfalls limit CSE focus and management? 







This research will focus on the reliability and availability of specific CSE.  
Additionally, this research will focus on AA rates and how they are impacted by CSE.  
The final focus will be on identifying ways in which reorganizing, redistributing, or 
adjusting authorizations of CSE can improve AA.  
Methodology 
A case study methodology is utilized for this research with interviews necessary 
for the collection of qualitative data.  This method was chosen, because it provides a 
broad approach to examine the phenomenon associated with a number of unknown 
relationships in a dynamic environment such as flightline and back-shop maintenance 
operations. A multiple-case study will be performed consisting of six separate F-16 bases 
(Shaw, Luke, Nellis, Hill, Eielson, and Holloman Air Force Base (AFB), with a cross-
case study being performed at the end.  The six bases were selected in order to maximize 
the variability between geographic location and mission priorities for the purpose of a 
more comprehensive analysis of the stateside F-16 fleet.  The case study at each location 
will examine the flying mission, aircraft breakage rate, AA, support equipment 
authorizations and quantity on hand, Mean Time Between Failure for powered CSE, 
demand for CSE, and other factors which are sure to present themselves on location. 
Once the case studies are performed and reports are generated, a cross case 
analysis will be performed to identify specific support equipment assets for inclusion in 




historical equipment and aircraft data for the purpose of uncovering any quantifiable 
relationship between the two.   
Assumptions/Limitations 
In any research it is necessary to make simplifying assumptions in order to focus 
attention on the variables of interest.  In this research, the first assumption was that the 
data collected and the analysis performed on the specific aircraft maintenance unit 
samples are representative of the greater whole of similar aircraft.  Additionally, it is 
assumed that CSE will have a greater impact on AA for those aircraft systems which are 
not able to be tested, powered on, or otherwise operated by an internal capability of the 
aircraft during maintenance.  For example, an aircraft with an Auxiliary Power Unit 
(APU) will be less reliant on a function CSE pool for items such as ground power carts, 
hydraulic test carts, or other similar ground support equipment due to its ability to apply 
power to those systems through internal power systems.   
 In addition to the assumptions made, this research had limitations which were 
necessary due to data, time, and financial limitations.  Because of those limitations, every 
piece of support equipment could not be examined thoroughly enough to identify its 
impact on Aircraft Availability.  In addition, this study is limited to six specific F-16 
maintenance units in order to draw assumptions about the larger F-16 fleet and it is also 
limited by the time of year, specific missions, and geographic locations of the units 
studied.  Finally, breakage rates of both aircraft and CSE are sure to fluctuate with any 
variation in these attributes and this study therefore cannot seek to explore the multitude 





The implications of this research is in the ability for the Air Force to more 
accurately assess its CSE needs as they relate to AA and the greater mission.  This study 
aims to uncover the relationship between availability of CSE and the availability of 
aircraft as well as to quantify that relationship such that known CSE pool sizes and 

















II. Literature Review 
Chapter Overview 
The review of literature for this study focuses on AA as well as CSE to include 
Aerospace Ground Equipment (AGE).  The AA metric will be broken down to show the 
variables which are used to calculate this primary measure of mission readiness.  
Additionally, literature which focuses on the AA metric will be discussed to identify a 
lack of focus on Not-Mission Capable for Maintenance (NMCM) the metric where CSE 
has the greatest impact.      
Aircraft Availability 
As the primary metric for measuring fleet health and mission readiness, AA is the 
go-to measurement when determining how a fighter squadron or wing is prepared to 
accomplish their mission.  Like many high level metrics, AA is comprised of many lower 
level metrics which are each calculated using different measurements (see Figure 1).  The 
2009 Maintenance Metrics Handbook states that, 
The MC rate will no longer be the yard stick for measuring the health of the fleet.  
Instead maintenance managers will utilize aircraft availability which takes more 
than just MC rate into account.  Not-Mission Capable Both (NMCB), Not-
Mission Capable Supply (NMCS), (NMCM), unit possessed not reported 
(UPNR), and depot times will be used when calculation the overall health of the 







The Aircraft Availability metric is calculated using the following formula: 
 





Technical Order 00-20-2 defines Mission Capable (MC) hours as the following, “Mission 
Capable (MC) hours are the sum of MC hours in the following Possession Purpose Codes 
(PPCs): CA….” (Department of the Air Force, 2009).  It further defines Total Active 
Inventory (TIA) as “hours [that] are the possessed hours of the following PPCs: BJ….” 








The Mission Capable Rate metric is calculated using the following formula: 
 
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 =




Technical Order 00-20-2 defines Fully Mission Capable (FMC), Partially Mission 
Capable (PMC), and possessed hours as “the sum of hours in the following PPCs: 
CA….” (Department of the Air Force, 2009)  
Both FMC and PMC rates are calculated using a similar formula, with the 











FMC and PMC rates are calculated using PMC and FMC hours which are a 
function of the metric Not-Mission Capable Maintenance (NMCM), Not-Mission 
Capable Supply (NMCS) and Not-Mission Capable Both (NMCB).  This metric is 
generated at the lowest level by way of aircraft statusing from the flightline with NMCM 
and NMCS being the core measurements.  NMCM is the level at which this study will 
focus on as it is where CSE has the most direct impact on AA.   
As referenced above, the ability for aircraft to fly, fight and win is enabled by 




of which captures an aircraft which is not FMC due to non-supply related issues.  The 
NMCM metric is further broken down into one of five sub-designations all with generic 
definitions as to the state of maintenance activities.  While any of these sub-designations 
could be used to account for an inability to perform maintenance due to unavailable CSE; 
a specific code to capture such a gap in equipment is not currently available.  Such a code 
would give greater flexibility to statusing of aircraft while allowing for an audit trail of 
equipment’s impact on the repair of aircraft.  NMCM is a lagging metric which 
represents the “percentage of unit possessed (reported) aircraft unable to meet primary 
assigned missions for maintenance reasons (includes NMCM and NMCB) Desired Trend 
(down)” (Raney, Young, & Golden, 2009) and is the most common and useful metric for 
determining if maintenance is being performed quickly and accurately (Raney, Young, & 
Golden, 2009).  The problem with NMCM being the lowest level metric is that although 
it is used to determine the speed and accuracy of maintenance, no further explanation as 
to why the aircraft is statused as NMCM is required.  The reason is hypothesized that 
maintenance personnel are in the process of performing repairs, that the aircraft is 
unavailable for maintenance due to its physical location or another factor limiting 
maintenance personnel from accessing it, or as is the hypothesis of this study, that 
maintenance is unable to be performed due to the unavailability of necessary support 
equipment.  
Factors Other Than Funding and Their Effects on AA 
While funding is often pointed to as a key indicator of AA or MC, it should not be 




Arostegui, 2001) (Theiss, 2013).  For example, equipment has been examined to 
determine its impact on AA, but that look has largely been relegated to AGE which, 
although it is a large part of CSE, it’s not the only equipment required to maintain a fleet 
of aircraft (Havlicek, 1997) (Kaya, 2002). 
With the lack of funding and focus on equipment outside of AGE, leaders must be 
more aware of what factors influence AA so that a more meaningful assessment for 
targeted improvement areas can be made (Fry, 2010).  As shown in Figure 2, 53 factors 
have been shown as potentially impactful to MC rates; the predecessor to AA (Oliver, 
Johnson, White III, & Arostegui, 2001).   

















Personnel in each skill-





Repair funding Possessed hours Base repair 
cycle time 
F-16 maintenance 
personnel in various Air 
Force specialty codes 
(AFSC) 
Policy changes Code 3 breaks Contractor 
logistics 
support funding 




personnel by skill-level 
per AFSC 
Contingencies 8-hour fix rate Mission support 
funding 























and so forth) 
Supply 
downtime 
Personnel per aircraft 
ratios 
 Aircraft age Repair actions/hours Acquisition 
logistics 
funding 
Over-Gs Depot repair 
cycle time 
Maintenance officers 










Figure 2: Factors Impacting MC Rates 
 
Factors may include personnel, environment, reliability/maintainability, funding, 




(Oliver, Johnson, White III, & Arostegui, 2001).  Additionally, higher level variables 
such as mission type, primary base, Major Command (MAJCOM), aircraft age, mission 
priority and spare parts availability from a supply standpoint are other areas where a 
diminishing CSE pools may impact (Theiss, 2013) (Oliver, Johnson, White III, & 
Arostegui, 2001).   
Support Equipment 
 Support equipment consist of all equipment (mobile or fixed) that is not 
inherently part of the primary weapon system, but is required to support the operation and 
maintenance of the system. The support equipment includes associated multiuse end 
items, ground handling and maintenance equipment, tools metrology, calibration 
equipment, test equipment and automatic test equipment.  It also includes the labor for 
the support equipment itself (Defense Acquisition University, 2013).  One of the most 
ubiquitous subsets of CSE is AGE which is managed by specialists from a pooled asset 
sense.  AGE personnel maintain and repair a number of generators, test stands, 
maintenance platforms, heating and cooling units, munitions handling equipment, and 
many other assets.  These assets are used in various maintenance activities and are 
integral to aircraft maintenance personnel’s ability to produce aircraft in flight ready 
conditions.  While nowhere near as abundant, testing equipment used to functionally 
check various systems of an aircraft are just as important to the maintainability of a fleet.  
This facet of support equipment includes testers used to check cabin pressure, test radar 
warning systems, simulate altitude, check operability of weapons systems, and many 




equipment can be categorized as accessories/fixtures which are used during removal or 
installation of laptops, cables, or other calibration equipment used on the aircraft.   
Equipment Inventory Levels 
 Equipment level authorizations begin with a unit’s tasked Unit Type Codes 
(UTCs) which outline potential capabilities or specific missions that the unit may be 
tasked to provide (Department of the Air Force, 2012).  From that UTC, Allowance 
Standards are built which identify the amount and type of equipment required for that 
specific mission (Department of the Air Force, 2012).  These authorizations are combined 
to show the total number of each asset allowed for the unit which they then requisition 
through the supply system.  This number represents the maximum allowable number of 
assets however, not necessarily the number which they will receive.  Since there is a 
finite amount of support equipment available in the supply system, units typically operate 
at a level lower than that which they are authorized.   
Shared Resources 
To further complicate the business of aircraft maintenance is the nature of 
ownership for many support equipment pieces.  While many assets such as testers, 
fixtures and other small pieces of equipment fall under the maintenance unit’s span of 
control, larger assets are typically pooled together as a common shared resource across 
the wing.  Without direct ownership over the assets, a potential exists whereby competing 
maintenance units could exhaust resources available to the overall wing by maximizing 




2008) (Wade, 1987).  For example, a maintenance squadron consisting of three 
maintenance units is assigned six hydraulic test stands for common use.  One of those 
squadrons utilizes four of the stands concurrently for maintenance activates while the 
remaining two test stands are unserviceable due for repair.  This scenario leaves the 
remaining two maintenance units without the ability to use a test stand for their own 
maintenance actions, thereby delaying their ability to return broken aircraft to a ready 
status.  If the same six assets were not managed through a common pool but were instead 
issued out to each squadron then the likelihood of one squadron using all of the resources 



















 The goal of this research is to explore the relationship between CSE and AA to 
determine if the two are quantitatively linked.  To do this, a mixed methods approach was 
undertaken to explore each side.  A case study was performed to qualitatively examine 
the problem to identify potential support equipment assets for further study.  Next, a 
quantitative examination of historical data for the specific pieces of support equipment 
identified during the case study was performed. The first section of this chapter will 
explain case study methodology and its purpose in this research while the second section 
addresses the quantitative analysis of data pertaining to specific support equipment assets.  
Scope 
The scope of this research was determined in conjunction with its sponsor, 
AFMC/A4.  The F-16 was chosen due to the maturity of the aircraft, a large number of 
active duty stateside locations, and an abundance of aircraft data.  The selected locations 
for the case study were all six active duty stateside F-16 bases: Shaw AFB, Luke AFB, 
Holloman AFB, Nellis AFB, Hill AFB, and Eielson AFB.  Although an abundance of 
aircraft specific data was available, similar data for equipment was not.  The case study 
was therefore chosen to narrow down the large number of support equipment items 





The purpose of the case study was to narrow down the field of available support 
equipment for statistical analysis. When this study was first undertaken, the concept of 
Common Support Equipment was used in a broad sense so as not to limit literature 
research.   
Interviews 
Instead of beginning the case study methodology with a massive list of assets, a 
blank slate approach was taken with inputs from subject matter experts (SME).  These 
inputs included the identification of specific pieces of equipment that the SME felt had 
the greatest impact, were unreliable, were difficult to obtain, or had a high degree of 
scarcity. These SMEs were chosen based on their experience with the aircraft, as well as 
their position and job description.  The list included Aircraft Maintenance Unit Officers 
in Charge, Aircraft Production Superintendents, Aircraft Expeditors, Equipment 
Custodians (support section personnel), AGE Production Superintendents, AGE 
Expeditor/Floor Leads, Precision Measurement Equipment Laboratory (PMEL) Flight 
Chiefs, and Backshop Repair Leads.  The interviewees were asked a series of four 
questions designed to uncover which support equipment items were most difficult to get, 
hardest to keep in service, or least reliable.  The following questions were asked: 
1) Which CSE items are most scarce/highly sought after? 
2) Which CSE items are least reliable?   
3) How confident are you that these CSE items will work when used? 




5) What would you do if this piece of equipment was not available?  
6) How often do you call for/need each piece of equipment? 
7) What pieces of CSE overlap in their purposes?  
8) Which one is the primary and which is the secondary? 
9) How does CSE affect NMCM?    
10) How would a classification of NMCM-CSE effect your reporting? 
11) How do you track CSE status?     
12) How could CSE status tracking be improved?  
13) What database do you input tracking data into?  
14) What are your current levels of CSE compared to your authorizations? 
The interviewees were not asked to give any specific number of responses or any specific 
category of equipment.  From these interviews, a response matrix was produced which 
painted a picture of the assets needing a quantitative examination.   
Selecting Equipment  
Once both the case study analysis and cross case analysis was performed, a total 
of 51 equipment items were identified by at least one to as many as 17 interviewees.  
From this list, six individual pieces of support equipment were identified as potentially 
having the highest likelihood of affecting AA with 22.2 percent to 37.8 percent of 
interviewees identifying each asset as being impactful to maintenance, difficult to obtain, 
scarce, or unreliable.  Those pieces of equipment are the Environmental Control System 
Test Set (ECS Tester), Joint Services Electronic Combat Systems Tester (JSECT Tester), 




Generating Nitrogen Cart (SGNSC), and the Hydraulic Test Stand (MULE).  The AGE 
assets were not able to be included in this study however as the database used to track 
their maintenance, Integrated Maintenance Data System (IMDS), is unable to produce 
reports of maintenance activities greater than 90 days in the past.  IMDS only captures 
this information if the maintainer who entered the data at the time of the maintenance 
action elected to check a box to archive the data.  The study therefore focuses on the 
JSECT, TTU-205, and ECS test sets.     
Gathering Data 
To conduct a statistical analysis of these support equipment assets as they relate to 
AA, a 12 month history of each serial numbered asset was compiled from each base.  The 
data used came in the form of “History by Label” reports which were pulled from the 
PMEL Automated Management System (PAMS).  These reports were used because they 
recorded each maintenance action on every serially tracked tester in the study.  Of the six 
bases selected for the case study, Hill AFB was the only base which did not use the 
PAMS system to record maintenance actions on testing equipment.  For this reason, Hill 
AFB was omitted from the statistical analysis.  The “History by Label” reports were used 
by mapping out each tester’s down time during FY16.  This was done by identifying the 
date each tester was broken out (taken from the Julien date portion of the Job Control 
Number (JCN) and the date the tester was repaired.  That timeframe was blocked out in 
order to show a period of unavailability.  Next, each asset type was then examined to 
determine its percentage of availability during each month of FY16.  The availability 




# 𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅
# 𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜 𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ∗ # 𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜 𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒 𝐴𝐴 𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴ℎ
 
Equipment days available are calculated using the following formula  
# 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜 𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ∗ # 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜 𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴 𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴ℎ − # 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜 𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒 𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴ℎ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 
 
For example, during the month of October 2015, Holloman AFB was authorized five 
JSECT testers but only had four issued to them.  This meant that there were 124 tester 
days available (4 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜 ∗ 31 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜 𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒 𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴 = 124 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜) of which 50 tester 
days represent the number of days when a tester was unavailable.  The percentage of 
availability during the month of October for JSECT testers at Holloman therefore is: 






This calculation is applied to each base, asset type, and month during FY-16 in order to 
obtain data suitable for statistical analysis. 
 Aircraft specific data was much easier to gather since it could all be pulled from 
LIMS-EV in the Weapons System View module.  This module provides an à la carte 
recall of metrics for any aircraft type, time period, theater or a multitude of other filters.  
LIMS-EV Weapons System View module was therefore used to pull AA, NMC, PMC, 8-
hr fix rate, and TAI numbers for the six bases of study during FY-16.   
Conclusion 
It is clear from the data collection that gathering aircraft specific data is a quick 




In contrast, gathering equipment specific data is much more labor intensive and requires 
accessing multiple systems which may or may not have the ability to show historical 
data.  An ideal scenario for equipment data collection would be a LIMS-EV Equipment 
module which mirrors the capabilities of the current LIMS-EV Weapons System View 
module for aircraft data.  Such a capability would eliminate the necessity of this study as 
a comparison of AA and support equipment could be performed with a few clicks of the 
mouse.  This chapter explains the logic behind case study design, interview process, 


















Case Study Results 
Each base presented unique circumstances which affected their ability to generate 
aircraft for flying.  Although there were differences between the units in terms of 
mission, geography, MAJCOM and footprint, there were also similarities which were 
captured as well.  The following paragraphs identify the unique situations, specific 
challenges, and the recurring theme of issues at each location.  
Site 1: Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina 
Shaw Air Force Base was the largest F-16 operation in terms of total aircraft 
assigned as well as the number of squadrons with 80 F-16s and three combat F-16 units.    
The goal of this case study was to examine the operations at Shaw AFB to understand the 
mission and assess which support equipment pieces may be affecting the ability for 
maintenance personnel to ready the aircraft for flying operations.  Aside from this, Shaw 
AFB acted as the pilot case study and in doing so it acted as a gauge for all interview 
questions and this location was used to identify personnel of interest at a typical F-16 
base who may have information which was of importance to the study.  During the visit 
to Shaw Air Force Base, seven individuals were interviewed including Production 
Superintendents, Expeditors, an AGE Production Superintendent, and an AGE 
technician.  In addition to these individuals, PMEL supervision, Support Section 
personnel (equipment custodian), Logistics Readiness Squadron (LRS) Equipment 
Specialists, and the Maintenance Squadron Commander and Chief Master Sergeant 




complete, Shaw seemed to have a unique situation from a number of respects.  First, as 
the only base with three combat F-16 squadrons, Shaw had a larger footprint of support 
equipment than other bases from an absolute perspective.  This meant that they were able 
to obtain lateral support in the event that a particular piece of equipment assigned to their 
unit was inoperable, deployed, in calibration, or otherwise unavailable for use.  In 
addition to this, the ability to “Frankenstein” testing equipment together appeared to be a 
real advantage for maintenance personnel.  The idea of “Frankensteining” testers into a 
working set was common amongst all of the bases which had multiple F-16 units or 
multiple units on base with common testers.  This would happen if one squadron had a 
working tester CPU but did not have a working set of cables/accessories or vice versa.  
Shaw AFB was also unique in that an ANG F-16 unit was stationed roughly 30 minutes 
from their location at McEntire Joint National Guard Base which they utilized from time 
to time during equipment shortages.   
However, one limitation that Shaw AFB had was that as the largest combat unit, 
they would often deploy one or more squadrons at a time, sometimes to separate 
locations.  This meant that the practice of sharing and “Frankensteining” equipment, 
which they had come to rely on at home station, was no longer available to them in the 
deployed location.   
Finally, of the seven individuals interviewed, only three mentioned the ECS or 
205 testers as being difficult to obtain or unreliable while no interviewees identified the 




Site 2: Luke Air Force Base, Arizona  
 Unlike Shaw AFB, Luke AFB was strictly a pilot training base without a 
deployment mission.  This meant that the aircraft returned to their location every day 
with the rare exception of depot or other maintenance which took place off station.  
Maintenance personnel from AGE, flightline and backshop operations were interviewed 
again for the purpose of capturing the F-16 operations and identifying problem areas 
which were created or exacerbated by CSE.  During the case study visit, Luke AFB was 
in the process of transitioning from five F-16 units to two F-16 units and three F-35 units.  
This meant that the footprint of available equipment for F-16 maintenance purposes was 
lower than it had once been; which can be indicated as a factor which may have 
contributed to their maintenance and AA metrics.  It was also mentioned during the 
numerous interviews that Luke AFB may be gaining an additional F-16 unit which would 
be transferred from Hill AFB in Utah.  
 Luke AFB was unique not only for their flying mission, but also for the fact that 
there were F-16s located on base which belonged to foreign military operations, namely 
Singapore.  This meant that they had the ability to share equipment with the hosted 
countries maintenance operation, so long as it was compatible with the U.S. aircraft.  One 
final piece of information which was presented during this case study was that as an 
AETC base without a combat mission, Luke AFB was able to status and fly aircraft in a 
PMC condition which would require an NMC status at a combat base.  This meant that 
systems such as Rear Warning Radar (RWR) or other non-flight-critical systems which 
would need to be troubleshot or tested using specific and hard to obtain testers could be 




mask problems with CSE availability and reliability in that AA may not be negatively 
affected if specific testers were not available.   
Finally, of the nine individuals interviewed, three mentioned the JSECT tester as 
being difficult to obtain or unreliable while four identified the 205 tester and three 
identified the ECS tester to be difficult to obtain or unreliable.      
Site 3: Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico 
Holloman AFB in New Mexico was commonly referred to as “Luke East” during the 
study because it has the same pilot training mission as Luke AFB in Arizona.  The F-16s 
located here were transferred from Luke AFB in 2014 and 2015 during which time 
Holloman’s F-22 squadrons were transferred to Tyndall AFB, Florida.  Holloman AFB 
operates two F-16 squadrons in the same manner as Luke AFB in that the aircraft takeoff 
and return to Holloman AFB every day with the exception of maintenance actions taking 
place off station.  With such similar operations, Holloman AFB was almost identical 
from a maintenance standpoint when compared to Luke AFB.  One notable difference 
however was the lack of F-16 specific infrastructure and support from a back shop 
perspective.  Many construction projects were underway during my visit in order to better 
facilitate F-16 maintenance.   
Additionally, with the F-16 only recently being transferred to Holloman AFB, not 
all of the required support equipment was available.  For example, while Luke AFB had a 
compliment of six TTU-205 testers for two squadrons, Holloman AFB only had four for 
the same aircraft footprint.  Maintenance personnel revealed during different interviews 
that they would often borrow TTU-205 testers from Global Hawk units also stationed at 




Finally, of the seven individuals interviewed, four identified the JSECT tester as 
being difficult to obtain or unreliable while three identified the 205 tester to be difficult to 
obtain or unreliable and another three identified the ECS tester to be difficult to obtain or 
unreliable.      
Site 4: Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada 
Nellis AFB in Nevada operates three F-16 units, only two of which were assessed 
for the purpose of this study.  Those two units operated aggressor F-16 operations for Red 
Flag missions and test F-16s for operational and developmental test missions.  The third 
unit, USAF Thunderbirds, was not assessed due to the unique and limited mission for 
which they are responsible.  Nellis AFB is home to a wide array of aircraft including F-
15, F-16, F-22, F-35, and A-10.  This benefits the F-16 maintenance operations in that 
other aircraft units potentially own support equipment which could be used by F-16s if 
needed.   
Nellis AFB was unique in a number of aspects from the diverse aircraft presence 
to the unique mission of test.  One notable difference in Nellis’ operations was that all 
AGE maintenance was performed by contractors instead of traditional AF personnel.  
However, it was not clear if this operation had any effect on the overall availability of 
AGE, but it was the only base to rely on contracted AGE maintenance.   
Finally, of the 11 individuals interviewed, nine cited the JSECT tester as being 
difficult to obtain or unreliable while four identified the 205 tester and three identified the 




Site 5: Hill Air Force Base, Utah 
Hill AFB in Utah hosts one F-16 unit, which is slated for transfer to another 
location due to the bed down of F-35 units.  Three other F-16 units had recently been 
transferred to other locations in the USAF leaving only one F-16 unit at Hill AFB.  At the 
time of the case study visit, many F-16s from the last remaining unit were TDY to Nellis 
AFB for Red Flag operations.  While the vast majority of F-16s had been transferred 
from Hill AFB, not all of the support equipment assigned to those units had been 
transferred with them leaving a larger than normal pool of available support equipment 
assets behind.  In addition, Hill AFB was home to the F-16 depot line which had a large 
assortment of F-16s in various states of repair and upgrade.  This meant that additional F-
16 specific support equipment was available to flightline maintainers if necessary.   
Finally, of the seven individuals interviewed, no interviewees mentioned the 
JSECT tester as being difficult to obtain or unreliable while only one identified the 205 
tester and two identified the ECS tester as being difficult to obtain or unreliable.            
 
Site 6: Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska 
Eielson AFB in Fairbanks, Alaska operates a unique F-16 operation from many 
standpoints.  Not only do they operate a small number of F-16s, but they are 
geographically separated from any other F-16 unit to the greatest extent when compared 
to all other stateside F-16 units.  One particular point of emphasis which was observed 
during the case study visit was that Eielson does not operate a PMEL laboratory but 
instead ships all of its assets that require calibration/repair to Elmendorf AFB in 




direction, it adds a level of complexity to the logistics required to repair or calibrate 
equipment.   
Finally, of the four individuals interviewed, one identified the JSECT tester as 
being difficult to obtain or unreliable while two identified the 205 tester and only one 
identified the ECS tester as being difficult to obtain or unreliable.      
Interview Results 
In addition to the specific support equipment assets which the SMEs felt were of 
concern or difficult to get/keep in a serviceable condition, two factors presented 
themselves during interviews with the flightline and AGE personnel.  The first factor 
noted during interviews was the PMEL.  Each PMEL is responsible for calibrating and 
performing limited repair on a wide array of equipment located at their respective base as 
well as equipment sent to them by agencies outside of the base.  Each piece of equipment 
requiring calibration will receive an initial calibration before it can be used by the unit to 
which it is assigned.  The equipment is calibrated using information found in WEB 
AFCAV which identifies the specific tests to run as well as the prescribed calibration 
interval.  After the calibration is performed, the equipment is tagged with a calibration 
label identifying the date of calibration as well as the date when that calibration expires.  
At that time, the equipment will be entered into PAMS where a complete history of that 
asset is kept. 
The second factor which presented itself during interviews was the practice of 
sharing and “Frankensteining” equipment in order to obtain a serviceable test set.  Test 




the tester itself, a cable set and an accessory set.  A successful test of the aircraft requires 
a fully functional set of all components as any faulty part will render the set unusable.  
With only a handful of issued test sets in each squadron, the likelihood of having a fully 
functioning set was low.  This meant that maintainers would often rely on sister units or 
visiting units to provide parts and pieces to make a fully functioning set.  This practice 
was noted at every case study location with Shaw AFB routinely borrowing equipment 
from a Guard F-16 base which was geographically separated from them by roughly 30 
minutes.   
Equipment Data 
After conducting 45 interviews, the interviewee responses were compiled and 
each piece of support equipment identified during the interview was recorded.  Figure 3 
shows the number of interviewees who identified each of the top 10 items as being 
potentially impactful to aircraft maintenance.   
From this list, the top three testers were selected as the basis for statistical testing.  
Originally the top three AGE assets were also selected to be included for analysis, but a 
lack of complete and available data made that task impossible given the timeframe of the 
study.  The data system which tracks maintenance actions on AGE assets only retains 
data for a short period of time (three months) after which it is purged from the system 
unless the maintainer who inputted the data selects the automated history button at the 







Figure 3: Interviewee Response Matrix 
 
In order to determine if the JSECT, 205, or ECS test sets were predictive of 
Aircraft Availability, a one year history of each base was collected for each of the testers 
assigned to F-16 units.  That data came in the form of History By Label reports which 
were pulled by each base’s PMEL laboratory from the PAMS system.  Each report 
showed both the JCN containing the Julian date when the tester was broken out and the 
job completion date which showed when the tester was fixed.  These dates were mapped 
out for all of FY-16 to show when each tester was out of service.  Figure 4 shows a 
sample mapping for September 2016 at Holloman AFB. 
 

















37.8% 17 JSECTS Tester
37.8% 17 MULE
35.6% 16 205 Tester
28.9% 13 ECS Tester
24.4% 11 -60
22.2% 10 128 Tester
22.2% 10 SCNGS
20.0% 9 Boresight Equip





After mapping out all of the testers, the availability percentage for each tester at 
that base was calculated for each month using the formula: 
# 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜 𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ∗ (# 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜 𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒 𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑅𝑅 𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴ℎ − # 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜 𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜 𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅)
# 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜 𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑜𝑜𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃 ∗ #𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑜𝑜 𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒 𝐴𝐴ℎ𝑅𝑅 𝑒𝑒𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴ℎ
 
In addition to the tester availability percentage, the number of testers sent to PMEL each 
month as well as the average duration of repair/calibration was also calculated to capture 
the tester’s reliability and reparability.  Figure 5 shows the above calculations at 
Holloman AFB for the entirety of FY16. 
 
Figure 5: Calculated Tester Variables Example 
 
 Four additional variables were thought to be predictive of AA and were added to 
the data set for analysis.  These included a seasonal component in the form of monthly 
dummy variables in JMP, TAI (Total Active Inventory) which represented the number of 
F-16s assigned to each base, the assigned aircraft block numbers at each base, and the 
average age of aircraft at each base.  The TAI, assigned block numbers, and average age 
were pulled from the LIMS-EV Weapons System View module.  Figure 6 shows all of 





Figure 6: List of Variables 
 
 Although Aircraft Availability is the primary focus of this study, lower level 
metrics were also included into the analysis as they have the potential to be impacted by 
support equipment.  These metrics are MC rate, NMC rate, PMC rate, and 8-hr fix rate, 
all of which were pulled from LIMS-EV Weapons System View.   
Analysis 
Aircraft Availability 
The first test performed on data was a one way analysis and Tukey-Kramer test 
between bases and AA.  Figure 7 shows that Eielson AFB has a significantly higher range 
of AA with the lowest point being higher than the highest point at all other bases.   
Variable
JSECT % Available
JSECT # to PMEL
JSECT PMEL Turn Time
ECS % Available
ECS # to PMEL
ECS PMEL Turn Time
TTU-205 % Available
TTU-205 # to PMEL









Figure 7: One Way AA by Base 
 
The results from this test meant that the five bases could not be treated as one 
population but would instead need to be treated as two distinct populations.  Using a 
blocking scheme to separate Eielson from the rest of the bases, a stepwise analysis was 
executed using a P-value threshold stopping rule and a mixed direction for variables 
entering and exiting the model.  The P-value to enter the model was set at .05 with the 
probability to leave set at .1.  The resulting model created from this analysis identified 
aircraft block numbers as the most predictive with very low P-values (see Figure 8).  One 
tester variable, JSECT # to PMEL, was identified in this model but it was insignificant 
when compared to the aircraft block number coefficients.  This model did have a 
relatively high adjusted R2 of .768 however but due to the insignificance of the tester 







Figure 8: AA Model 
 
Mission Capable 
The next analysis was conducted in the same manner as the AA analysis but MC 
was used for the response variable.  After performing a one way analysis to include the 
Tukey-Kramer test, it was apparent that thee distinct populations existed which would 
need to be blocked before performing further analysis (see Figure 9).  The blocking 
scheme used for this test was with Eielson AFB as one set, Shaw AFB as a second set, 





Figure 9: One Way MC by Base 
 
A stepwise analysis was executed on MC using the same settings as the test for 
AA with similar results (see Figure 10).  While the adjusted R2 value of .678 showed that 
the chosen model fit fairly well, the variables identified by the analysis were Block 32 
aircraft and August.  The lack of any tester variables entering into this model again meant 





Figure 10: MC Model 
 
Partially Mission Capable 
Like the previous two analyses, a one way analysis of the variable against all five 
bases revealed that Holloman AFB was significantly different than the other bases in 
terms of average PMC (see figure 11).  A blocking scheme was created to separate 





Figure 11: One Way PMC by Base 
 
The stepwise analysis was performed for PMC using the same settings as the 
previous tests for AA and MC.  This test returned a model which had the highest adjusted 
R2 of any tests performed to this point and included the JSECT % available variable as 
well as the average aircraft age variable (see Figure 12).  Since this model included a 
variable related to the testers of interest and its coefficient was significant, further 
diagnostics of the model were performed.  In order to validate the model, the assumptions 
of constant variance, normality, and independence were tested.  The first check 
performed on the model was to ensure that none of the selected variables were overly 
influential to the model by checking the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) scores associated 





Figure 12: PMC Model 
 
Since none of the points were higher than 5, it was determined that no 
multicollinearity existed in the model.  Constant variance was then checked using the 
Breusch-Pagan test which returned a P-value of .0035 indicating that constant variance 





Figure 13: Breusch-Pagan Result 
 
 Normality was then checked by performing a Shapiro-Wilk test for goodness of 
fit against the residuals saved from the model.  Figure 14 shows the results of this test 
with a P-value of.0195 indicating that the distribution was not normally distributed.  A 
visual check of the data indicated that while the Shapiro-Wilk P-value indicated a failure, 
visually the data seemed to be normally distributed.   
 










The last test performed on the model was to check for independence using the 
Durbin-Watson test on the residuals of the model.  Figure 15 shows the results of this test 
and with a P-value of less than .0001, the test for independence did not pass.  The results 
from these tests show that although a high adjusted R2 was generated for the model, it 
was not selected for use since it did not pass diagnostic tests for constant variance, 
normality or independence.      
 
Figure 15: PMC Durbin-Watson 
Not Mission Capable 
To test whether NMC was at all predictable by the variables included in this 
research, a one way analysis was used as the starting point to see if the bases could be 
treated as one population or if a blocking factor needed to be applied.  Figure 16 shows 
the one way analysis with Tukey-Kramer pairings applied.  The results from this test 
show that three distinct populations existed and blocking factors were created to account 
for the differences. 
With the blocking factor applied, a stepwise analysis was performed with NMC as 
the response variable.  Figure 17 shows the results of the stepwise analysis which did not 
identify any tester variables as predictive which meant that this model was not examined 






Figure 16: One Way NMC by Base 
 
 




8-Hr Fix Rate 
The final response variable to be examined was the 8-hr fix rate which began with 
the same one way analysis shown in Figure 18.  Unlike the other metrics examined, the 8-
hr fix rate did not require a blocking factor in order to test for predictive variables.  A 
stepwise analysis was executed against the 8-hr fix rate with poor results.  Figure 19 
shows that no tester variables were chosen in the selected model with only two months 
being identified as predictive but with an adjusted R2 value of .281 indicating a very poor 
model.  This model was therefore not explored further.     
 





Figure 19: 8-Hr Fix Rate Model 
 
Lag-1 Variables 
An additional set of scenarios considered in this research was that AA is being 
affected by the previous month’s tester variables or that a current month’s AA was 
predictable by the previous month’s AA.  These scenarios were explored through the use 
of a Lag-1 variable for AA and each of the nine tester variables.  These were added to the 
data set in JMP and a fit model was run against each of the response variable considered.  
The results of this Lag-1 analysis was that each model produced was predictable 
primarily by the previous month’s AA.  Some of the Lag-1 variables and some of the 




low that they were not considered to be significant to the model and the models were 
therefore not explored further.   
Analysis Summary 
After examining the variables against each of the five metrics it is clear that none 
of the variables examined are predictive.  Although the PMC metric seemed to be 
predictable by at least one tester variable, it failed all tests levied against it and was 
therefore abandoned.  The result of these tests therefore is that none of the variables 
included in the research are predictive of AA, MC, PMC, NMC, or 8-hr fix rate for 
stateside Active Duty F-16s during FY-16.    
Summary of Findings 
While no statistical significance was found between any of the chosen predictor 
variables and the examined response variables, the limitations of this study meant that 
only a small fraction of the equipment needed to support a very limited subset of the Air 
Force’s fighter fleet could be studied.  Additionally, given that the period of time 
included in this research was only one year, it is feasible that the equipment examined 
may have had significant impact before or after the window of study.  Further limiting the 
scope of this research are the maintenance data systems used to track support equipment.  
From the original list of possible equipment candidates for research, six were chosen for 
further study but three of those items were removed due to a lack of necessary data.  The 
remaining three support equipment items were only able to be studied because the precise 
calibration requirement levied upon them meant that a robust data system was in place 




all support equipment, this research would have included more items for analysis and 
different conclusions may have been reached.   
Although the quantitative portion of this research did not reveal any significant 
link between CSE and AA, the qualitative portion may reveal the reason.  During the 45 
interviews at five bases, a recurring theme was present when it came to testers and similar 
support equipment.  The practice of borrowing equipment in whole or in part from other 
units on base, visiting units, or even units at nearby bases was common amongst all 
maintenance units.  This “Frankensteining” of equipment, as it was often referred to, 
enabled maintainers to get the job done and ready the aircraft even if they did not possess 
the equipment necessary to do so.  While this undoubtedly lead to more sorties and a 
healthy fleet, it may also have led to a masking of problems with support equipment by 
not allowing the mission to fail.      














V. Conclusion and Recommendations 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter summarizes the research accomplished in the preceding section and 
discusses the outcomes related to the questions proposed in the introduction.  It also 
highlights recommendations for future research.   
Problem Statement and Research Questions 
AA is being negatively impacted by a CSE fleet which has become less reliable 
than designed even though the current number of CSE assets available are above the 
authorized levels.  In order to explore this problem, a set of research questions were 
compiled which sought to quantify the AA and CSE relationship and capture 
maintenance practices which may explain the relationship qualitatively.  The research 
questions guiding this research were: 
1. What impact does common support equipment (CSE) have on Aircraft 
Availability? 
2. What statistical relationship best describes how CSE authorizations and levels 
affect aircraft availability? 
3. What LIMS-EV Equipment View shortfalls limit CSE focus and management? 
4. What MX work-arounds mask the impact of CSE on aircraft availability? 
 
From a quantifiable standpoint, this research did not uncover any impact that CSE 
has on AA.  All of the analyses performed showed factors such as aircraft block number, 




variables were shown to be predictive.  Anecdotally the story is much different however 
as many interviewees stated that they knew CSE was impactful to AA but those same 
interviewees would later comment that they would beg, borrow, and steal in order to get 
CSE required to fix an aircraft rather than let that aircraft remain unrepaired.   
Question two was not able to be explored quantifiably as it is derived from 
question one.  If a working model would have been uncovered where on hand and 
authorized levels could have been manipulated, then a quantifiable answer may have 
been given for this question.  Qualitatively however, each base identified the need for 
more equipment and higher authorizations.  Although the CSE identified as being short 
differed from base to base, the interviewees almost always identified the same equipment 
as being difficult to obtain/unreliable as well as needing an increased authorization.  
Answering question three may offer one of the largest takeaways from this 
research.  The lack of a robust equipment maintenance tracking system severely limited 
this research and necessitated multiple data pull request from each of the bases involved 
in the research.  Additionally, the limitations of IMDS meant that half of the equipment 
selected for study was eliminated before any analysis could be performed as the data 
necessary for analysis was not available.  If these underlying systems were in place, or 
were redesigned such that maintenance information inputted into them was kept for long 
periods of time as a default, then a LIMS-EV Equipment module could be built to pull 
from those systems and aggregate the data in a user friendly way similar to the LIMS-EV 
Weapons System View module.  Current practices to manage enterprise wide pools of 




The final question offers the other large takeaway from this research and may be 
the reason why no quantifiable relationship could be established between CSE and AA.  
The maintenance mentality of “make it happen” or “solve for yes” means that 
maintainers routinely go to extraordinary lengths to ensure that the mission does not fail.  
While these efforts are indeed laudable from an aircraft readiness standpoint, they mask 
the true state of CSE and may do more harm than good.  The heroics involved in making 
the mission happen often require maintainers to borrow equipment from sister units, TDY 
units who are visiting their base, foreign service units stationed at their base, non F-16 
units on their base, and even units from other components at other bases in close 
proximity.  This “Frankensteining” of equipment as it was often referred to, was 
identified at all six bases during the case studies.  Even if the equipment was not able to 
be cobbled together from multiple units, some CSE shortfalls were masked by the 
maintenance unit carrying a PMC condition on their aircraft.  Pilot training units for 
example could be without a working JSECTS tester but still keep their aircraft flying 
because the system calibrated by the tester was not needed for pilot training.  As an 
example, one of the two units at Holloman AFB had 22 of 25 aircraft assigned to them in 
a PMC condition due to an unavailability of JSECTS at the time of the case study.  At a 
combat unit, the same condition would be highlighted as the 22 aircraft may not be 
considered available, but at Holloman AFB, no decrease to AA was recorded during this 





Recommendations for Future Research  
Capturing sufficient data was a severe limitation to this research and as such the 
pool of equipment studied was cut in half.  A future research opportunity on this same 
topic would be a long term study of one location with a stand-alone data recording 
scheme.  If Shaw AFB were selected, for example, a research protocol could be 
developed where usage tracking sheets were assigned to multiple pieces of equipment for 
a six month period.  Since Shaw AFB was included in this research, the same six pieces 
of equipment could be selected for study thereby eliminating the need for equipment 
selection research.  Maintainers who used the equipment would need to record the date 
and time that each piece of equipment was attached to an aircraft for use as well as the 
time it was removed.  The maintainer would also record the aircraft tail number and 
performance of the piece of equipment such as whether the equipment worked without 
flaw or if problems occurred.  Additionally, backshop repair functions would also need to 
record when the piece of equipment entered into repair or service actions, what the action 
was and whether it was schedule or unscheduled.  A longitudinal study of this nature 
would allow researchers to track the movements of multiple pieces of equipment across 
one base to see how often they were used, how they functioned, and how often they were 
sent to repair.  This would allow for a better picture of the heroics involved in 
accomplishing the mission which may not be captured through traditional maintenance 
tracking programs.   
In addition to the limited data available from the CSE perspective, this research 




additional recommendation for future research is to repeat the study with a different 
airframe, a different USAF component, or in a different location.  The factors identified 
by interviewees as important or of interest for this research may be different depending 
on the aircraft platform, component of service, or geographic location.  Aircraft like the 
F-22 or F-35 for example would be prime candidates for a parallel study as they do not 
share common tester equipment with other aircraft and would therefore not benefit from 



















Appendix A.  Interview Protocol 
 CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN INTERVIEW 
 
 
DISTRIBUTION OF AIRMEN TIME RESEARCH 
 
You have been asked to participate in a research study conducted by researchers from the Air 
Force Institute of Technology (AFIT), Graduate School of Engineering and Management, 
Department of Operational Sciences. The main objective of the project is to determine the impact 
of Common Support Equipment (CSE) on Aircraft Availability.  The results of this interview will 
be included in a report and briefing to AFMC/A4M, as well as a thesis defense. You were 
selected as a possible participant in this study because of your knowledge, experience, and first-
hand account of the tasks of interest. You should read the information below and ask questions 
about anything you do not understand before deciding whether or not to participate.  
 
- This interview is voluntary.  
 
- You will not be compensated for participating in this interview.  
 
- The information you tell us will be kept confidential.  
 
- Data collection for this project will be completed by December 2016.  All survey 
documents will be stored in a secure work space until 1 year after that date.  The 
documents will then be destroyed.  
 
I understand the procedures described above.  My questions have been answered to my 




Name of Subject:                                                              
 
 
Signature of Subject ____________________________  _________ Date ____________    
                                
 
Signature of Investigator _____________   __________Date _______     __ 
  











1) Which CSE items are most scarce/highly sought after?    
2) Which CSE items are least reliable?      
3) How confident are you that these CSE items will work when used?   
4) How does sharing these assets affect your ability to use them?   
5) What would you do if this piece of equipment was not available?   
6) How often do you call for/need each piece of equipment?    
7) What pieces of CSE overlap in their purposes?     
8) Which one is the primary and which is the secondary?    
9) How does CSE affect NMCM?       
10) How would a classification of NMCM-CSE effect your reporting?   
11) How do you track CSE status?        
12) How could CSE status tracking be improved?     
13) What database do you input tracking data into?     












































































































Jan Shaw 0.774 0.417 1.022 0.63 0.66 0.34 0.13 0.62 3 81 2 1 6 28.00 31.00 9.00
Feb Shaw 0.871 0.405 1.118 0.66 0.7 0.3 0.16 0.51 3 80.6 2 2 3 15.00 16.50 5.67
Mar Shaw 0.532 0.363 1.156 0.7 0.73 0.27 0.14 0.64 3 80 4 3 1 31.50 17.00 4.00
Apr Shaw 0.696 0.400 1.144 0.7 0.73 0.27 0.12 0.56 3 80 3 2 2 24.33 18.00 11.00
May Shaw 0.871 0.360 0.941 0.72 0.75 0.25 0.08 0.66 3 80 2 2 4 16.00 26.00 21.00
Jun Shaw 0.867 0.367 0.897 0.64 0.69 0.31 0.1 0.51 3 80 3 3 4 10.67 16.00 24.25
Jul Shaw 0.899 0.323 0.844 0.63 0.65 0.35 0.11 0.5 3 80 2 4 5 12.50 16.50 24.00
Aug Shaw 0.952 0.352 0.831 0.56 0.59 0.41 0.12 0.57 3 80 2 3 8 6.00 18.33 15.63
Sep Shaw 0.983 0.386 1.019 0.55 0.6 0.4 0.13 0.44 3 80 1 4 5 4.00 10.25 10.60
Oct Shaw 0.661 0.465 0.997 0.61 0.65 0.35 0.13 0.56 3 81 3 1 4 27.67 12.00 15.50
Nov Shaw 0.567 0.408 1.150 0.66 0.7 0.3 0.11 0.55 3 81 4 2 2 26.00 16.50 3.00
Dec Shaw 0.673 0.411 1.148 0.6 0.63 0.37 0.1 0.61 3 81 4 1 2 20.25 2.00 19.00
Jan Luke 1.000 1.008 0.973 0.61 0.79 0.21 0.21 0.54 2 53 0 4 1 0.00 15.25 5.00
Feb Luke 0.879 1.405 0.989 0.55 0.71 0.29 0.16 0.5 2 53 1 2 1 7.00 5.50 2.00
Mar Luke 0.935 1.371 0.731 0.58 0.77 0.23 0.31 0.55 2 53 1 1 4 4.00 16.00 12.50
Apr Luke 0.817 1.367 0.850 0.58 0.75 0.25 0.18 0.46 2 53 1 2 4 11.00 8.00 6.75
May Luke 0.968 1.194 0.903 0.61 0.74 0.26 0.14 0.45 2 53 1 2 2 2.00 19.00 9.00
Jun Luke 1.000 1.492 1.000 0.62 0.75 0.25 0.18 0.38 2 53 0 1 0 0.00 1.00 0.00
Jul Luke 1.000 1.315 0.694 0.7 0.84 0.16 0.27 0.46 2 53 0 2 6 0.00 11.00 9.50
Aug Luke 0.774 1.226 0.919 0.61 0.73 0.27 0.27 0.41 2 53 1 2 2 14.00 16.50 7.50
Sep Luke 1.000 1.500 1.000 0.64 0.76 0.24 0.27 0.58 2 53 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00
Oct Luke 0.968 1.355 0.978 0.61 0.73 0.27 0.29 0.49 2 53 1 3 1 2.00 6.00 4.00
Nov Luke 1.000 1.375 0.983 0.55 0.7 0.3 0.21 0.61 2 53 1 1 1 1.00 15.00 2.00
Dec Luke 1.000 1.258 0.742 0.57 0.75 0.25 0.23 0.36 2 53 4 3 0 12.00 10.00 0.00
Jan Holloman 0.232 0.403 0.403 0.62 0.79 0.21 0.62 0.58 2 55 3 1 1 12.00 12.00 12.00











Mar Holloman 0.742 0.427 0.500 0.62 0.78 0.22 0.68 0.7 2 55 1 1 0 9.00 9.00 0.00
Apr Holloman 0.780 0.492 0.392 0.59 0.75 0.25 0.66 0.69 2 55 1 1 1 3.00 1.00 13.00
May Holloman 0.600 0.411 0.500 0.65 0.79 0.21 0.62 0.67 2 55 1 3 0 31.00 3.67 0.00
Jun Holloman 0.600 0.500 0.375 0.64 0.77 0.23 0.61 0.52 2 55 1 0 1 15.00 15.00 15.00
Jul Holloman 0.710 0.500 0.194 0.67 0.8 0.2 0.65 0.46 2 55 1 0 2 14.00 0.00 19.00
Aug Holloman 0.426 0.250 0.250 0.65 0.74 0.26 0.58 0.56 2 55 2 2 1 29.00 15.50 31.00
Sep Holloman 0.440 0.383 0.433 0.66 0.76 0.24 0.62 0.5 2 55 4 0 2 13.50 0.00 11.00
Oct Holloman 0.477 0.468 0.500 0.7 0.8 0.2 0.46 0.48 2 56 2 0 1 25.00 0.00 4.00
Nov Holloman 0.553 0.300 0.500 0.72 0.8 0.2 0.5 0.61 2 55.8 3 1 0 12.00 24.00 0.00
Dec Holloman 0.400 0.500 0.355 0.6 0.74 0.26 0.54 0.57 2 55 2 0 1 31.00 0.00 18.00
Jan Nellis 0.532 0.460 0.761 0.66 0.75 0.25 0.15 0.48 3 60 1 2 2 0.00 0.00 18.50
Feb Nellis 0.638 0.509 0.655 0.69 0.76 0.24 0.13 0.62 3 59.7 1 3 3 13.00 9.33 16.67
Mar Nellis 0.750 0.750 0.903 0.69 0.73 0.27 0.13 0.47 3 59 0 0 1 0.00 0.00 15.00
Apr Nellis 0.750 0.750 0.953 0.72 0.78 0.22 0.1 0.54 3 59 0 0 1 0.00 0.00 7.00
May Nellis 0.750 0.452 0.955 0.73 0.79 0.21 0.11 0.66 3 59 0 3 1 0.00 12.33 7.00
Jun Nellis 0.733 0.750 0.967 0.64 0.71 0.29 0.06 0.35 3 59 1 0 2 0.00 0.00 0.00
Jul Nellis 0.597 0.750 0.748 0.63 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.52 3 59 1 0 2 19.00 0.00 19.50
Aug Nellis 0.621 0.460 0.877 0.7 0.74 0.26 0.08 0.47 3 59 1 3 2 16.00 12.00 9.50
Sep Nellis 0.750 0.633 0.940 0.69 0.73 0.27 0.06 0.41 3 59 0 1 1 0.00 14.00 9.00
Oct Nellis 0.500 0.556 0.800 0.64 0.73 0.27 0.13 0.33 3 60 2 2 2 18.00 9.50 8.00
Nov Nellis 0.500 0.675 0.660 0.6 0.67 0.33 0.08 0.55 3 60 1 1 3 30.00 9.00 17.00
Dec Nellis 0.331 0.734 0.800 0.59 0.68 0.32 0.07 0.3 3 60 2 1 1 26.00 2.00 31.00
Jan Eielson 1.000 0.720 1.000 0.82 0.84 0.16 0.05 0.51 1 21 0 0 0 0.00 1.00 0.00
Feb Eielson 0.603 0.805 0.931 0.78 0.81 0.19 0.06 0.41 1 21 11.5 8.5 4 2.00 2.00 1.00
Mar Eielson 0.823 0.839 1.000 0.75 0.81 0.19 0.06 0.55 1 21 11 15 0 1.00 1.00 0.00
Apr Eielson 1.000 0.822 1.000 0.85 0.85 0.15 0.26 0.86 1 21 0 16 0 0.00 1.00 0.00
May Eielson 1.000 0.581 0.806 0.83 0.84 0.16 0.49 0.57 1 21 0 19.5 12 0.00 2.00 1.00
Jun Eielson 1.000 0.667 1.000 0.81 0.81 0.19 0.42 0.61 1 21 0 0 0 0.00 1.00 0.00
Jul Eielson 1.000 0.882 1.000 0.81 0.84 0.16 0.28 0.47 1 21 0 11 0 0.00 1.00 0.00
Aug Eielson 0.742 0.570 0.790 0.74 0.79 0.21 0.19 0.58 1 21 16 16 5 1.00 3.00 1.00
Sep Eielson 0.733 0.700 0.750 0.81 0.81 0.19 0.14 0.55 1 21 8 27 0 2.00 1.00 0.00
Oct Eielson 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.83 0.83 0.17 0.26 0.48 1 21 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00
Nov Eielson 1.000 0.922 0.767 0.84 0.85 0.15 0.18 0.6 1 21 0 7 14 0.00 1.00 1.00
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